

# AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF NORWAY-LED MULTILATERAL INTERVENTION ON THE COURSE AND DURATION OF THE CIVIL WAR IN SRI LANKA

Journal of Social Review  
Volume 2 (1)  
June 2014  
Department of  
Social Sciences

*M.M.Ihjas*  
*W.K.Ranjith Dickwella*

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## Abstract

*Over the recent past, there has been an increasing importance of managing civil conflicts with the involvement of international actors such as individual states, regional and international multilateral organizations (Regan 2002). In Sri Lanka, unprecedentedly, there had been a close international involvement in the peace process right from its onset in 2002 with the proclaimed attempt of finding political solution to the decades-long civil war between government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE). In this backdrop, this paper attempts to examine systematically the potential effects of Norway-led multilateral intervention on the course and duration of the civil war in Sri Lanka by using qualitative analysis based on major empirical argumentation of the scholarship of effects of external intervention in civil war situation. Results of the analysis suggest dichotomous findings that while supporting the empirical argument casts skepticism over the adequate treatment of factors that influence the outcome of intervention by the empirical studies.*

## Introduction

Combined intervention consisting of military, economic and diplomatic forms tend to be relatively effective strategy in shortening the expected duration of a conflict if it was framed at managing conflict and executed under specific sequence. As such, the sequence under which diplomacy (mediation) takes precedence over two other forms of economic and military has a high probability to decrease the expected duration of a conflict (Regan and Aydin, 2004). The results of their study suggest that diplomacy and mediation are a critical component in determining the effect of outside interventions and they are effective tools of conflict management. Further, it suggests that the performance of economic intervention is conditioned by their

combination with diplomacy and the sequence under which they are carried out. The fifth peace process in Sri Lanka which came into effect in 2002 February is a case which while shares aspects and characteristics identical to the specification described by the above empirical study in terms of forms and sequence of intervention strategies it offers an excellent opportunity to test potential effect of combined intervention by using qualitative methods of analysis that most of the empirical studies lack in their analysis, and thus they fail to capture complete picture of factors and conditions affecting expected outcome of intervention attempt.

In this sense, two different but interrelated questions are addressed in this paper. First,

what were the potential outcomes of the multilateral intervention in Sri Lanka, second what were the factors or conditions that affect intended outcome of the intervention in Sri Lanka. Two circumstances necessitate to raising these questions for systematic answer. First one stems out of methodological inadequacy of the empirical studies (quantitative methods) which either tends to overlook or is inadequate to address the effect of other unobserved factors (way of administration of strategies and subjective factors such as resolve and identity of the protagonists). Second one is associated with the opinion and expectation of policy community that intervention tends to shorten the duration of conflict, it is a view that runs in contrast to the empirical findings of intervention itself increases the expected duration of civil war (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000: Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000: Regan, 2002. 2003: Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Thus, this paper intends to address these two issues by answering those two questions in a more systematic manner in which qualitative methods (descriptive analysis) possibly replicate empirical argumentation and interpretation. For this purpose the following assumption is explored. That diplomacy centered combined intervention is effective in decreasing the expected duration of the civil war in Sri Lanka, and its level of effectiveness is conditioned to both role and effect of other two supplementary forms (economic and military) of intervention and their administration.

## Review of Literature

Past studies on the Fifth peace process of Sri Lanka demonstrate that there existed a combined or multilateral intervention composed of diplomatic, economic and military forms of strategies with the sequence in which Norway's mediatory

roles and functioning, preceded two other supplementary components of military and economic interventions by the US, EU and Japan respectively in a reasonable time period (by four years). However, the past studies suggest a mix of far-reaching effects resulted from the intervention throughout the three year period of time beginning from 2002 to 2005 (Noyahr, 2006: Suryanarayan, 2006: Saravanamuthu, 2006). Accordingly, it is widely agreed by the past studies that combined intervention had significantly influenced the duration of the conflict to the extent in which protracted cessation of hostilities and the resultant peace process was put in place (Athas, 2006: Venkataramanan, 2006: Uyangoda, 2005a).

## Methodology

As for the methodology, a descriptive analytical framework based on major argumentation and interpretation of empirical literature of external intervention and civil war duration is adopted. Accordingly, the major goal of all intervention attempts is the cessation of hostilities, regardless of the factors that motivated the intervention (Regan, 1996), and if there was a cessation of hostilities between the combatants for a period of more than six months after an intervention occurred can be regarded as successful intervention attempt at shortening the expected duration of a conflict (Regan, 2000). Moreover, all interventions attempts are presumably targeted at some sort of conflict management (Regan 2002).

## Defining Multilateral Intervention

A definition of multilateral intervention is in order. The usual type of cases such as where multiple states intervene on behalf of one side in an intrastate conflict with the goal of bolstering the capabilities of their client or UN authorized or sanctioned intervention do not fall under the rubric of what I call here

multilateral intervention in the Sri Lankan context and in this paper as well. By multilateral intervention I refer to the intervention by a group of states (Norway, USA, EU and Japan) that played collective and individual roles under the lead of Norway's mediation (diplomatic intervention), and their intervention entailed the active placement of personal and resource on the ground in Sri Lanka. More over, the phrase "combined intervention" is used in exchange of multilateral intervention on parallel basis here in order to avoid possible confusion and to facilitate analysis followed by interpretation of the results.

### **Norway's facilitation and Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)**

The presence of Norway as a third-party facilitator in the Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict resolution falls as back as 1998(Helegesen 2003:Samaranayake2006:Silva 2002). Norway had offered its services to bring the two parties together much earlier. These early efforts gathered momentum towards the end of 2001 when Ranil Wickreme singhe, who belonged to the opposition United National Party, became Prime Minister of Sri Lanka (Uyangoda, 2005a; Poncalan,2005).The unilateral ceasefire declared by the LTTE which followed by similar gesture by the new Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and their (both GoSL and LTTE) offer to the Norwegian emissaries that they were prepared for a just and honorable settlement paved way for the Norway facilitated negotiation process to begin with in 2002 February 22 with the signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) followed by Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) between the GoSL and the LTTE (Samaranayake, 2006: Suryanarayan,2006: Moolakkattu,2004).

However, the ceasefire agreement was not solely a result of Norway's years-long

constant diplomatic effort, but there were other domestic-military stalemate and international factors - post 9/11 atmosphere - that contributed to the realization of the CFA. (Samaranayake 2006 : Suryanarayan 2006 :Saravanamuthu 2006 : Shanmugaratnam and stoke, 2004: Gunatilake, 2006 : Uyangoda, 2005c). The spirit of the CFA is to serve as an instrument to maintain the *status quo* balance of capabilities in military and strategic terms between the combatants. In other words, CFA sought to freeze the military-balance between the protagonists in order to de-escalate violence which the protagonists perceived necessary, although due to different reasons, step towards negotiations (Uyangoda,2005a p337: Athas,2006 p122).It is CFA on which smooth progress of negotiation process stood on. This is to say that smooth progress of negotiation process necessitated the smooth implementation of CFA with compliance by and commitment of protagonists. It was agreed, according to the preamble of the ceasefire agreement, by both parties that bringing an end to the hostilities is a means of establishing a positive atmosphere in which further steps towards a lasting solution can be taken. Another role of CFA was to improve the life of the people in preparation for a settlement process (Uyangoda,2005a p338).Also it had a deterrent function and ensured that violations of the cease-fire have a significant political cost, both at local and at international level (Helegesen,2003).

### **Multiple interveners, combined strategies and peace process**

It was an unprecedented effort in the history of thirdparty involvement in Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict resolution that the involvement of a group of countries (Norway, the US,EU,Japan) with the proclaimed-aim of bringing an end to decades-long civil war through making individual and coordinated efforts and functions. Norway, as the principal intervener, had primarily engaged herself in

political and non-coercive diplomatic undertakings through its facilitatory and mediatory functions (Moolakkattu, 2005). The critical role that Norway played in drafting, finalization and enforcement of CFA through the mechanism called Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) underscored the onset of its active diplomatic involvement in the peace process which came into force shortly after the signing of CFA between the GoSL and LTTE in 2000 February. As an individual (diplomatic) role, Norway's functions was primarily associated with facilitating peace negotiations and assisting the protagonists in devising modalities to implement agreements reached upon between the protagonists during peace talks. In this sense, six rounds of such talks were held within one year (2000 March to 2003 April) with varying degree of outcome. The most imminent one of such outcomes was the consensus between the protagonists to jointly explore the possibilities for a federal solution to the conflict (Silva, 2003: Waldman, 2002).

With regard to the other interveners such as the US, European Union and Japan, they were all late comers into the process at the request by and invitation of both Norway and the protagonists, and played supplementary role of consolidation of the peace process, in differing capacity to the Norwegian diplomatic initiative.

### **Donor Co-Chairs and the peace process**

Co-Chairs of Sri Lanka's peace process is the economic component of the multilateral intervention consisting of countries such as the US, EU, Japan and Norway that used development aid assistance as their incentive to protagonists to move them forward with peace process. In that sense, they (Donor Co-Chairs) made a pledge of

\$4.5billion for developmental activities in the war-torn areas of Sri Lanka in 2003 after the Tokyo donor conference (Venkataramanan, 2006). Nearly one quarter of the package was pledged by Japan. However, the disbursement of this pledged aid was conditioned to the clear progress that the protagonists make in pursuing the peace process. As for the combatants, it was an incentive to drive them to profess their commitment toward the peace process by coming up with set of proposals for interim administration for North and East provinces to undertake developmental related activities with LTTE participation. As Japanese participant suggested that the promise of major external assistance expected to be some \$3 billion over three years was what had kept the disputing parties at the negotiating table (McDonald, 2003). In retrospect, it might have been useful to have had a co-chair mechanism from the beginning of the peace process, with a political mandate complementing aid coordination.

### **The US, EU and escalation of violence**

As a late comer to the peace process, the US joined the Co-Chairs at the request and persuasion of both the SLG and Norway to keep the LTTE on the peace process. The US approach, given the most of the statements relating to the peace process since early 2002 was not confined to expression of support, but had extended to trenchant criticism of and threat of use of force against LTTE. This fact had become clear when Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage made the remark that the US might hunt down the LTTE if it failed to renounce violence and terrorism (Venkataramanan, 2006 p208).

Further, an evidence demonstrating the tangible effect of the combined intervention is when it influenced the decision change of the LTTE over participation at the Geneva

talks vis-à-vis the review of effective implementation of the CFA with the GoSL. The LTTE was reluctant and wanted to avoid its participation at the talks citing tense situation on the ground allegedly caused by the GoSL security forces, although Erick Solheim, the Norway mediator, made efforts at his best to persuade them. However, the LTTE changed its decision to participate the talks following a statement by a US diplomat that carried a message of threat to use of force against them which cooled the tensions on the ground. As reported by *Economic and Political Weekly* (2006), the US diplomat was saying that "If the LTTE chooses to abandon peace, however, we want it to be clear, they will face a stronger, more capable and more determined Sri Lankan military. We want the cost of a return to war to be high" (2006). As for the results of the talks, both the protagonists agreed to comply with CFA by ceasing their hostile activities. For instance, the Sri Lankan government agreed to end Tamil paramilitary violence in Government controlled areas and disarm the groups. The LTTE agreed to control violence committed by Tamil civilian forces (Jeyeraj, 2006).

Not the US did pause its role only with making stunt statements but further she went on to donate USCG Cutter *Courageous* offshore patrol vessel to the Sri Lankan Navy, in order to strengthen its (SL Navy) capability to check and deter threats from LTTE's sea tiger fleet which frequent exercise and presence at Northern sea of Sri Lanka was great challenge to the GoSL and SLMM and the smooth existence of CFA was another example of the US to maintain balance of forces between the protagonists, and thus to ensure the continued compliance of them to CFA. It marked the first significant military hardware transfer to Sri Lanka (Embassy of Sri Lanka in Washington 2004).

Moreover, it (US) also tried to pursue other countries to take stern action against LTTE. As an official attached to the State Department mentioned, "We are in touch with governments around the world to bring to bear whatever pressure we can on the Tamil Tigers to abandon this (armed violence) course of action and to look for ways that we can support the government on coping with the threat" (*Tamil Guardian*, 2003 May 3 ).

On the other hand, European Union, one of the Co-Chairs, through its coercive diplomatic and economic approach toward the protagonists, particularly to the LTTE, helped to ensure the continued effect of the CFA which in fact was in grave danger of collapse when the LTTE assassinated Sri Lanka Foreign Affairs Minister at his Colombo residence. This was deemed as a blatant violation and threat to the CFA. However, as reported by the *Tamil Week* (May 18), the prompt action taken by the EU against LTTE both for the increasing violence (including the assassination of SL foreign minister) and its pull out from the Geneva talks with the GoSL by imposing a travel ban on the LTTE to EU member countries and later by formally proscribing LTTE as a terrorist organization, and thus asking member countries to freeze all its (LTTE) properties, bank accounts, holdings and companies, and to thwart its illegal tax collection among Tamil diaspora living in the European Union. As for the LTTE, the support-both political and financial-from the diaspora community is critically important to pursue its struggle (Saravanamuttu, 2006).

### **Success and failures of the peace process**

The six rounds of talks held between the SLG and the LTTE during one year period of time (from 2002 March to 2003 April) had yielded in mixed outcome with successes and failures. Of success, the protagonists were able to reach

some monumental agreements vis-à-vis some fundamental core-issues of the conflict i.e. agreement to find solutions to the issues including final solution to the conflict within federal framework. Of these, setting up an interim administration in the northeast of Sri Lanka under LTTE control was a major concession by the government to Tiger demands which were a prerequisite for further talks (Jayasinghe, 2003). Further, the CFA had been in effect for well over four years faced with ups and downs at times. As many would share this is the hallmark evidence of the overall effect of the peace process facilitated by Norway (Venkataramanan, 2006).

In short, as Uyangoda (2005a) pointed out, there were two crucial and historic gains in the 2002-2003 peace process. The suspension of the war between the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE is the first major gain. The ceasefire agreement, despite its many shortcomings, has demonstrated that it is possible to de-link Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict from war and violence between the state and Tamil political actors. Secondly, the commitment made by the government and the LTTE to explore a federal solution provides the basis for the historic compromise necessary to transform Sri Lanka's civil war into peace.

Among the failures, the most important was, although they (protagonists) agreed to set up a provisional interim authority for the North and East provinces (ISGA) to undertake rehabilitation and reconstruction activities under the LTTE's dominant participation, they could not reach an agreement over the structure, scope and authority of such mechanism (Uyangoda, 2005c). Second, the GoSL's inability to relocate, as it was agreed upon in the CFA, its armed forces stationed at sensitive but critical so-called high security zones (HSZ) in Jaffna peninsula. These two issues were

being claimed to be obstacle to resume talks, according to LTTE. However, there were other problems emerging in the later stage of the process.

### **Outcome of combined strategy**

It is possible, based on the overall effects of the peace process, to summarize the outcome of collective intervention on the following. As a matter of fact, the strategy had yielded with both positive and negative consequences in terms of the goal and objectives of the interveners. As for the intervener, they expected a speedy progress in the negotiation while making sure of strengthening of the CFA, and thus engendering short term solutions to the issues. As Uyangoda (2005c) maintained, in their (interveners) agenda, there was a heavy emphasis on short-term success. In that sense, a landmark ceasefire that has lasted for years has brought a degree of normalcy to the island after two decades of civil war. Regardless of the strains in the truce and uncertainty about the future of the peace process, the ceasefire brokered by the Norwegian government had held and the talks had progressed (Ediripullige, 2002; Samaranayake, 2006). The maintenance of the cease-fire agreement, particularly after the peace talks entered a stalemate, was largely due to the presence of international actors in the peace process (Uyangoda, 2005c).

Moreover, CFA of February 2002 dramatically changed the security situation in Sri Lanka. It was successful not only in formally stopping the civil war for the longest period since its inception but also in ending most direct attacks by the LTTE or government forces on each other, at least until late 2005. Also CFA was successful in bringing some normalization to the lives of many people in the north and east. In this sense, the ceasefire and the peace process had opened up space for a political solution to the conflict (Hoglund, 2005 pp.162 -166; Crisis Group 2006; Quoted in Silva, 2002).

In the run-up to the talks, the level of violence had dropped markedly, presumably demonstrating that both sides could be influenced to by the combined strategy which while persuading the protagonists with non-coercive mediation pushed them to do so with coercive measures such as threat of use of force and aid cut. The US coercive diplomatic approach towards to the LTTE had helped to keep the peace process honest. The US presence as a deterrent against the LTTE prevented the latter from abandoning the negotiating table. However, the optimism that characterized the situation on the ground in the first year of the peace process had gradually been replaced by growing frustration.

The following tables depict a comparative overview of the situational difference before and after of the Fifth peace process.

Table 1 total casualty (Killed in action and Missing in action) in Armed Conflict with LTTE (April 1983-feb2002)

Govt. Security Force Numb.	LTTE Number	Civilians (killed in the cross fire)
Army 17, 686	Cadres 17,763	SF+LTTE+riots 26,382
Navy 786	Against IPKF 592	
Air Force 432		
Police 2,387		
Aux Forces 151		
<b>Total</b> <b>21,464</b>	<b>Total</b> <b>20,335</b>	<b>Total</b> <b>26,382</b>

Source; Weerekoon B., (2006) p.33

SF=Security Forces

IPK=Indian Peace Keeping Force

Table 2 Casualties during the period of Ceasefire -Security Forces, LTTE and civilians (Killed by the both parties)

2002	2003	2004	2005
15	57 Included 25 Chinese fisher men)	28	160

Source; includes SLMM; Weerekoon B., (2006)

In respect to the consequences that seemingly not promising and somewhat frustrating the interveners altogether can be observed by looking at the relationship between the protagonists themselves and the interveners as well. As the ground reality would demonstrate, the CFA in deed had become almost defunct particularly after 2005 with an increase in the low-intensity hostilities between the protagonists. As the Crisis Group (2006) study claimed that CFA that led to the longest period of peace since the 1980s had already collapsed. The major failure of the 2002-2003 peace initiative as a process was that the parties did not succeed in signing even an interim political settlement to consolidate the gains of the CFA and six rounds of talks. They failed to sign an agreement for an interim administrative structure in 2003-2004. The ground conditions on which the peace process was launched in 2002 had changed considerably. The condition of strategic parity had been greatly altered. The trust between the government and the LTTE eroded considerably (Uyangoda, 2005c).

### Limits of Combined strategy

Combined intervention, as a strategy intended to influence the course of the conflict by changing the behavior of the protagonists, has its own constraints at least in the Sri Lankan context. This limit of the strategy is discernible from the remarks and comments

of the interveners and other actors involved in the process. For example, as Yashushi Akashi, the Japanese special envoy for Sri Lanka peace process, desperately observed that ownership of making peace is with both parties (Asian Tribune 2006). As Paikkiasothy Saravanamuthu (The Morning Leader, 2006) an observer of the peace process, noted that Japanese Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi's remarks regarding Co-Chairs' engagement in soul-searching draws attention to the possibilities and limitations that are integral to the role of the international community in the conflict transformation process in Sri Lanka. The soul-searching after all is also an admission of limited effect and impotence. To the effect of proving this fact, LTTE's chief negotiator once noted that actions and policies of the LTTE are determined not by the choices of the International community but by the deteriorating ground situations, according to the report by a Tamil daily *Virekesari* (2006).

This fact became even more obvious, according to the report by *Economic and Political Weekly* (2006), when the LTTE remained intransigent in spite of international sanctions and pressure, and enforced a boycott of the November 2005 presidential elections in the north and east. In doing so, they effectively ensured the defeat of Wickramasinghe, on whom the international community had placed its hopes for a resolution to the conflict. Following this, the LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran threatened to resume the war in his much awaited annual heroes' day speech in late November 2005. Further, in a situation where the EU ban was being mooted as pressure aiming to bring the LTTE to the negotiating table the LTTE ideologue was constrained to point out that the opposite may happen. Instead of promoting peace it may promote war he pointed out (Jeyeraj, 2006).

## Analysis

The above account of aspects (course of action and outcome) linked with Norway-led multilateral intervention in the peace process requires two levels of analysis in order to examine the assumption in a more sound manner. First, aspects and issues engulfed the strategy itself. Second, factors which potentially influenced the outcome of the intervention. The aspects and issues engulfed the combined strategy, although it largely fits the formula (combinations, sequence and framing) that empirical model demands - diplomatic intervention preceded the other two forms (economic and military) of intervention, - becomes subject to close examination over its objective and administration on the ground. In terms of the sequence under which Norway-led multilateral intervention was exercised, it followed the sequence, as the empirical model demands, where diplomacy and mediation (including facilitation) preceded in a reasonable amount of time (approximately four years commencing from 1998 to 2002). If that so, as the model suggests, the duration of the conflict should have reduced substantially (95% of probability of duration decrease (Regan and Aydin, 2004)).

This means high possibility of ending the conflict. However, based on the above description, it was not utterly the case in Sri Lankan context. In contrast, as the same model suggests, economic and diplomatic interventions have their greatest effect at the time they were implemented, and that this influence declines at a decelerating rate. To put it other way round, diplomatic interventions increases the likelihood that a civil war ends in the next month but as the period of time from the point of the diplomatic effort increases, the effect of the intervention decreases. For economic interventions, although they will initially increase the expected duration of a conflict, the



debilitating effect on the duration of a conflict decreases over time. Whereas, military form of intervention has no effect on the duration of the conflict, according to the model. Given this argument in the Sri Lankan context, it is very possible to posit that Norway facilitated peace process had brought about significant positive changes (some of them constitute as historical compromise and turning points). Nonetheless, most of the positive effects turned to intractable and controversial issues in the very next year (2003) when there was an active economic and coercive (military) interventions.

As such, it is highly possible to draw two different but interrelated inferences. First, that diplomatic intervention in itself was effective but limited in terms of continued leverage and influence on the combatants. It was effective at manipulating information, and that commanded compliance and commitment of the protagonists toward ceasefire agreement to some degree. Also, it was limited in exerting leverage and influence on the protagonists when the sensitive core-issues became forefront at negotiating table. This was particularly the case when protagonists were relatively par in military and strategic capabilities. Second inference that can be drawn is that lack of effective manipulation of the balance of capabilities between the combatants that were already in a state of stalemate seeking external assistance to way out of it. This specifically refers to the GoSL's position at the onset of the intervention and LTTE at the later stage, particularly after its split in early 2004. Therefore, shifting the balance of power in favor of weaker side would lead to its positional strength, and thus upsetting the negotiation process.

Third inference can be conceived to be exercise of only one of those two strategies. As the model posits, the most effective

interventions will manipulate costs/benefits from a peace agreement, and the level of misinformation or strategic uncertainty about adversaries' capability and resolve. It is discernible in the Sri Lankan context that the co-optation of the US, EU, Japan into Norway mediated negotiation process and the resultant international guarantee for support and punishment under the international safety net which affects the combatants' view of the international actors involved in the process. For instance, GoSL's view of it was very favorable whereas LTTE viewed it with great suspicion. As Balasinghem, LTTE chief negotiator, lashed out, it is excessive internationalization of the peace process, claiming foreign powers were trying to force solution on the Tamils (Noyahr 2006 p366) In contrast, Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Wickramasinghe said, 'if they (the tigers) break it (peace negotiation) they are going to be in trouble. I will not go alone down this road. I will go with the international community, so that the promises they make are kept' (2006). It was suggested by many that the travel ban imposed by EU on LTTE was a result of this international safety net

To make this point more precise, for LTTE, Norway's mediatory role was much acceptable and they were happy of that (Pirabakaran, leader of LTTE, hailed Oslo for its impartiality and objective neutrality) (Baruah, 2003) but they were often suspicious about the involvement of the US in the process (Involving US in the negotiation process was partly the reason for the LTTE to pull out of the talks, especially for using them for military as well as political purposes of Sri Lanka (Balasinghem, 2004 p 434).

In that sense, Norway's mediation was directed primarily toward manipulating the information of capabilities of combatants which in turn resulted in the conclusion of the historic truce agreement between the protagonists. On the other hand, economic

and military strategies while served as a back up for Norway's mediation efforts whose leverage and influence on the combatants, at a certain point, were diluted partly by the intransigent position of the LTTE on the interim self-governing authority and partly by the US's coercive and belligerent strategy toward LTTE helped salvage and uphold the CFA which continued existence with series of ups and downs on the ground underscores the undiminished effect of the combined intervention strategy.

## Conclusion

The preceding analysis on the potential effect of particular-with the sequence under which diplomatic component preceded over two other (economic and military) components- combined intervention strategy tends to suggest that on several respects and aspects (vitality in two ways) the strategy was relatively effective at least in prolonging the ceasefire agreement (CFA) between the combatants for more than three years with many ups and downs in its actual implementation. However, the effect of the strategy is particularly discernible in their (combatants) functional or military and positional or strategic capabilities. That the onset success of CFA in restraining the protagonists' capability of direct engagement, and thus maintained least level of violence paved way for the prevalence of negative peace throughout the country, at least for over one year, demonstrates the level of influence that the combined intervention strategy commanded on the duration of the conflict. On the other hand, concessions, compromise and agreements reached between the protagonists over fundamental issues of the conflict underscore the scale of effect that combined strategy inflicted on the course of the conflict.

Nevertheless, given the degree of effect and influence that combined strategy inflicted in Sri Lankan context in contrast to the degree that the empirical model (developed by Regan and Aydin) showed, it is obvious that there existed demonstrably a modest difference of effect between these two studies in terms of two respects; the degree of effect of the overall strategy; potential significant effect that military component of the strategy brought about. One possible reason for the difference of magnitude probably, as the model suggests, may be the difference of administration of the combined strategy on the ground. That, for the Sri Lankan context, the combined strategy was exercised both on individual and concerted capacities to exert pressure and persuasion on the protagonists. This difference of administration can possibly be attributed to be the factor that makes level difference of outcome between the findings of these two studies.

Lastly, it is debatable, at least based on the Sri Lankan context, that whether military component of the combined strategy plausibly affects the outcome of other two components. As the analysis shows it has remarkable influence, be it positive or negative, at least on the behavior of the combatants if not on the overall duration of the conflict. It can, therefore, be alternatively argued that overall outcome of combined strategy is not determined by the particular sequence of strategies alone but by the manner in which it is being administered on the ground, and the other subjective factors such as resolve and identity of the protagonists too.

However, it is being left for further future investigation and analysis that to what extent the multilateral intervention strategy can or should engender maximum positive outcome in which negative peace was replaced by positive peace. In the case of Sri Lanka, although the combined intervention was exercised for well over four years, it could

only yield negative peace with promising prospects for positive peace at least in the first two years of its commencement.

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